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Who Then Should Judge?:
Developing the International Rule of Law
under NAFTA Chapter 11
Charles N. Brower* and Lee A. Steven**
I. INTRODUCTION
One wonders what all the furor is about.
For all the calumny heaped upon Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA") by opponents of globalization, as well as more measured
responses by think tanks, academics, and the NAFTA Parties themselves, NAFTA's
investment protection and promotion regime is but another example of an evolving
consensus regarding international investment regulation. The theme of this evolution
over the past several decades has been internationalization and privatization, as
evidenced by the now ubiquitous Bilateral Investment Treaty ("BIT") and the
increasing use of investor-State arbitration of investment disputes. In the last decade
the BIT has become the predominant method by which States regulate investment on
the international plane' and it should come as no surprise that NAFTA's investment
protection scheme, including provision for the arbitration of investor-State disputes,
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1. By one count, of the 1162 BITs worldwide signed as of Sept 22, 1997, 829 had been signed since
1990. Status of Investment Treaties, 36 ILM 1404, 1404 (1997). A more recent count estimates that the
number of signed BITs now stands at about 1800. Antonio R. Para, AprpIaVe Substantie Law tn
ICSID Arbitrations Initiated under Investment Treaties, Address Before the Seventeenth ICC
Court/AAA/ICSID Colloquium on International Arbitration (Nov 10, 2000). (On fi&e with the
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is essentially identical to that of the vast majority of BITs concluded since 1990. The
NAFTA Parties themselves have negotiated no less than eighty-six BITs with other
States2 and Chapter 11 closely follows the US Model BIT.
Criticism of Chapter 11, which has emanated almost exclusively from Canada
and the United States, is all the more ironic because its inclusion in NAFTA was
accomplished despite initial resistance by Mexico. Consistent with its BIT policy
towards other developing countries, the United States lobbied hard to include
Chapter l1's investment protections precisely because it wanted "to liberalize Mexican
restrictions on investment and to lock in legal protections for [US] investors."3 US
wariness of Mexico's investment climate was not without precedent. Experience with
the Mexican expropriations of foreign-owned agrarian and oil concerns in the early
part of the twentieth century had prompted US Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in a
now famous exchange of notes with the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, to
formulate the position that "no government is entitled to expropriate private property,
for whatever purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment
therefor." Prior to NAFTA, Mexico had long held (consistent with the practice of
Latin American countries in general) that foreign investors did not enjoy investment
protection beyond that afforded to its own nationals under domestic law.' That
Mexico was willing to accept substantive investment protections and investor-State
arbitration of investment disputes under an international treaty was a major
vindication of an important, long-standing US policy.
The only potentially unique aspect of NAFTA Chapter 11 is that the
governments of two nations with developed economies agreed to enter into an
investment protection treaty between themselves. The overwhelming majority of
2. As of November 1, 2000, the United States has signed forty-six BITs, thirty-one of which have
entered into force and fifteen of which are awaiting ratification. US Department of State, Bureau of
Economic and Business Affairs, List of US Bilateral Investment Treaties (Nov 1, 2000), available online
at <htp://www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/bit-treaty.html> (visited Mar 25, 2001).
Canadian BITs, known as foreign investment protection and promotion treaties, number twenty-
four (twenty in force and four signed but not yet in force). Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade, Listing of Canada's Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreements (FIPAs)
(Oct 26, 2000), available online at <http://www.dfair-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/fipa-e.asp> (visited Mar
25, 2001). Mexico has negotiated sixteen BITs (seven of which are in force) and is actively engaged
in the negotiation of several more. SECOFI, Instrumentos de Promocid6n, available online at
<hrrp://www.secofi-snci.gob.mx/Inversi-n/Inst-de-promoci-n/ins-de.-promocLn.htm> (visited
Mar 25,2001).
3. United States General Accounting Office, North American Free Trade Agreement: Assessment of Major
Issues: Report to Congress, GAO/GGD-93-137B at 19 (Sept 1993).
4. Green H. Hackworth, 3 Digest of International Law § 288 at 658-59 (GPO 1942).
5. Like other Latin American countries, Mexico incorporated the Calvo Doctrine in its constitution.
This doctrine, named after the Argentine statesman who first propounded it, holds that an alien
must rely on the law and procedure of the local jurisdiction for the resolution of disputes arising
from commercial activities in the local jurisdiction and may not petition its own government to
espouse its claim in an international forum.
COo 2 91o. 1
'ZQ)o 'T~en Sfhoufdjudge? Bo&crrt~
BITs to date have been North to South, between capital-exporting countries and
capital-importing countries, and the private investors who actually have benefited
from such treaties have been those from the North. Practically speaking, countries
such as Canada and the United States simply have not had to worry that they would
ever have to defend a claim in arbitration under a BIT. The cross-border investment
flows between Canada and the United States, however, are astronomically higher
than, for example, those between Cameroon and the United States, and it was
inevitable, once NAFTA's investment protection regime became operative, that
Canada and the United States would be defending themselves before an international
tribunal. Indeed, it is no coincidence that all of the Chapter 11 cases thus far
commenced against the United States have been brought by Canadian nationals and
all but one of the cases against Canada have been brought by US nationals. One may
surmise that at least some of the distress felt by Canada and the United States over
NAFTA Chapter 11 has been caused by the novel and disconcerting fact of having to
live up to the same substantive and procedural guarantees that they have required of
their BIT partners.
Of course the fact that the NAFTA Parties are getting precisely what they
bargained for does not necessarily answer the specific criticisms being leveled against
Chapter 11. In analyzing the substance of this criticism, however, one should not lose
sight of the reasons why the NAFTA Parties negotiated Chapter 11 in the first place.
NAFTA Chapter 11 creates substantive investment protections that are enforceable
in arbitration by the individuals directly impacted by any breach of such protections.
In establishing this investment regime, the NAFTA Parties wanted to achieve three
main objectives: (1) to tear down existing foreign investment barriers by eliminating
arbitrary and discriminatory restrictions; (2) to build investor confidence throughout
the region through the elaboration and enforcement of clear and fair rules; and (3) to
depoliiciZe" the resolution of investment disputes by eliminating the need for State-
to-State adjudication. Any criticism of the Chapter 11 regime that fails to take
account of these three factors is, literally, beside the point.
IL REALIZING THE AIM AND PURPOSE OF NAFTA CHAPTER 11
Section A of Chapter 11 establishes the substantive investment protections that
each NAFTA Party is required to honor, including the better of national treatment
or most favored nation treatment, the minimum international standard of treatment,
elimination of performance requirements, free transfer of funds, and expropriation
protection. The point of these protections is to establish a rule-based investment
regime in which foreign direct investment can thrive. Specific barriers to and
6. See Ibrahim F.I. Shihara, Towards a Greater Depotirization of Investment Diutes Ti.: RMes cfI CSlD
and MIGA, 1 ICSID Rev-Foreign Inv LJ 1, 4-5 (1986).
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restrictions on investment are eliminated and positive guarantees are extended.
Moreover, all of this is done at the international level so as to place all three NAFTA
countries and their investors, so far as possible, on an equal footing.
Section B of Chapter 11 is intended to reinforce that regime and make it work by
giving foreign investors standing to bring claims in arbitration against the NAFTA
Parties for breach of the substantive investment protections found in Section A. A
rule-based system must have an enforcement mechanism if its substantive rules are to
have any meaning over the long term. Just as important, however, is the form which
that enforcement mechanism takes. After all, giving private individuals standing to sue
a State before an international tribunal was not the only means of enforcement open
to the NAFTA Parties. Consistent with existing international practice, the Parties
could have relied on diplomatic protection, requiring the government of each
NAFTA country to espouse the claims of its nationals. Alternatively, the Parties
could have required that Chapter 11 claims be litigated in the domestic courts of the
three NAFTA countries.7
Neither of these alternative options, however, would serve the aims of Chapter
11 as well as does investor-State arbitration. Investor confidence, for example, is not
furthered by requiring domestic litigation. Indeed, the fundamental reason that the
great majority of modern investment protection treaties have opted for international
adjudication is that domestic courts are often in fact, and, just as important, usually
are perceived to be, biased against alien investors, especially when those courts must
evaluate and pronounce upon acts of their own governments. Further, domestic courts
often do not have the legal expertise and experience to free themselves from the
confines of their own domestic regimes so as to give proper attention and respect to
international law (which, along with NAFTA itself, expressly governs Chapter 11
disputes'). Another factor is that the interests of alien investors are more vulnerable
than those of local investors because, as aliens, they are cut off from any direct
participation in the host State's political process and are therefore in greater need of
protection at the international level. An international dispute resolution mechanism
best serves Chapter 11 precisely because the NAFTA Parties are trying to build an
international investment protection and promotion regime, a rule-based system that
will be elaborated and enforced uniformly and consistently in each of the three
NAFTA countries.
Equally important was the choice of investor-State dispute resolution over State-
to-State adjudication. A system that originates in diplomatic protection-a product
7. Yet another alternative would have been to create a standing NAFTA Tribunal to resolve
investment disputes. The great advantage of this kind of system is the ability to generate a uniform
body of substantive and procedural law, creating greater consistency over time, but the significant
cost to the NAFTA Parties of maintaining such a body makes its realization improbable.
8. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Art 1131(1), 32 ILM 605, 645 (1993).
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of expediency, it may be noted, from a time when the international legal order did not
recognize the individual as able to invoke international law-places the burden and
expense of prosecuting an investment dispute on the investor's government, a process
that can be highly inefficient, arbitrary, and politically explosive: inefficient because
governments are pressured to prosecute, or at least investigate, a great number of
frivolous claims that would not otherwise be pressed if the responsibility and cost of
prosecution remained with the individual investor; arbitrary because the exigencies of
time, money, political priorities, and the whims of individual bureaucrats may cause a
government to downgrade, or even ignore, meritorious claims; and politically explosive
because diplomatic protection has the distinct disadvantage of pitting two States
against one another in an inherently confrontational setting where, once a case is
commenced, government officials cannot be seen as acting indifferently to the interests
of their nationals. International "incidents," and the longstanding resentment and ill
will between nations they generate, simply are not as likely to occur when the private
investor itself has the right and the responsibility to prosecute its own claim and hence
only one government is actively involved in the litigation.
III. NAFTA's EXPROPRIATION PROTECTION
In light of the above discussion, what is one to make of the outpouring of critical
comment concerning Article 1110, NAFTA's expropriation provision? On its face,
Article 1110 appears uncontroversial (at least to an international lawyer). The
provision prohibits expropriation without the requisite compensation, a standard rule
of international law (with recognized exceptions such as confiscation as a criminal
penalty or as a defense measure in time of war) that also has been incorporated in
most BITs worldwide. Further, Article 1110 requires expropriations to be for a public
purpose, non-discriminatory, and in accordance with due process of law and the
international minimum standard of treatment. All of this is standard fare.
One might think that the controversy surrounding Article 1110 would center on
the detailed elaboration of how compensation is to be determined and paid, which
adopts the investor-friendly position long advocated by capital-exporting countries
such as the United States at the expense of the sovereign-friendly rules proposed and
vigorously advocated by developing countries in decades past Such is not the case,
however. Controversy exists primarily because Article 1110 applies not only to direct
seizures of property, but also to any State "measure tantamount to nationalization or
expropriation," and to a variety of property rights, both tangible and intangible
(including contract rights). Article 1110, together with the arbitral mechanism
9. On the latter see United Nations, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of Stares, GA Res 3281,
UN Doc A/9631 (Dec 1974), reprinted in 14 ILM 251 (1975); Resolution on Permanenr





established in Section B of Chapter 11, thus makes it possible for investors to recover
in arbitration for so-called indirect expropriations, ° including wealth deprivation
caused by legislation, regulation, and other government actions that fall short of
outright seizure and control of property.
For critics of NAFTA, including in particular environmentalists, Article 1110
goes too far by making it possible for private corporate interests to "undermine"
legitimate governmental regulations in a "supranational" forum insulated from the
usual domestic political and legal processes." Moreover, at least one of the NAFTA
Parties (Canada) formally has called for a clarifying interpretative statement regarding
Article 1110 because the "NAFTA Parties never intended the expropriation and
compensation provisions of NAFTA Chapter Eleven to limit the legitimate rights of
governments to regulate."2 Canada argues that Chapter 11 should not give investors
the right to seek compensation for wealth deprivation caused by "acts or measures
(that] are non-discriminatory and within the normal exercise of a State's regulatory
prerogative."" This statement begs the question, however, because, depending upon
how it is interpreted, it (1) simply restates an existing rule of international law that
would be applied by any international tribunal hearing an expropriation claim under
NAFTA Chapter 11, or (2) unjustifiably seeks to modify the existing rule of
international law relating to indirect expropriation in a manner not supported by the
language of Article 1110.
The mere fact that NAFTA recognizes the possibility that governments may be
responsible for regulatory actions that destroy or severely damage the value of a
property right should be uncontroversial. State responsibility for indirect
expropriation is a recognized principal of customary international law" and not an
innovation of NAFTA. At the same time, however, international law also recognizes
that, in general, "[a] state is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic
10. For a general discussion of issues related to indirect expropriations under international law, see
Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property, 1 ICSID Rev-Foreign Inv LJ 41 (1986); Burns
H. Weston, 'Constructive Takings" under International Law: A Modest Foray into the Problem of 'Creeping
Expropriation*, 16 VaJ Intl L 103 (1975).
11. Consider Howard Mann and Konrad von Moltke, NAFTA's Chapter 11 and the Environment:
Addressing the Impacts of the Investor.State Process on the Environment, International Institute for Sustainable
Development Working Paper (1999), available online at <http://iisdl.iisd.ca/pdf/nafta.pdf> (visited
Mar 25,2001).
12. Nihal Sherif, Canadian Memo Identifies Options for Changing NAFTA Investment Rules, Inside US
Trade 1, 20 (Feb 12, 1999) (reprinting and commenting upon a Chapter 11 operational review
memo authored by John Gero of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade).
13. Id at 21. Canada has pressed this argument as a defense on the merits in a least one Chapter 11
arbitration. See Pope & Talbot Inc v Government of Canada, Award Uune 26, 2000) at para 90, available
online at <http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b3P&T.htm> (visited on Mar 25, 2001).
14. Consider Dolzer, 1 ICSID Rev-Foreign Inv L J 41 (cited in note 10); and Weston, 16 Va J Intl L
103 (cited in note 10).
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disadvantage resulting from bona fide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime,
or other action of the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police power of
states, if it is not discriminatory."5 Moreover, NAFTA Chapter 11 itself provides that
"[niothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting,
maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken
in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns."1
Whether all nondiscriminatory regulations that fall within the normal exercise of
a State's police power are, or should be, categorically exempt from compensation is
another matter. just as the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the
government's police power under US lav does not extend so far, 7 so it is understood
that a State may be responsible under international law for "taxation, regulation, or
other action that is confiscatory, or that prevents, unreasonably interferes with, or
unduly delays, effective enjoyment of an alien's property."" There is nothing in
NAFTA generally or in Article 1110 in particular that suggests that the NAFTA
Parties collectively intended to modify this rule of international law so as to immunize
governments categorically from culpability with respect to indirect expropriations.'Y
Of course it cannot be gainsaid that it is often an extremely difficult, politically
sensitive task to distinguish between a compensable taking and a non-compensable
regulation in a specific case. Indeed, this appears to be Canada's real concern:
[C]ustomary law and the writings of leading commentators have yet to articulate
clear rules to distinguish between a compensable taking and non-compensable
regulation.
In this light, how can an interpretation confirm that the regulatory actions of
government are not covered to the extent that such actions or measures are
reasonable on their face? Could we confirm that it would be up to the challenger of
an act or measure to demonstrate an absence of bona fides, or an abuse of
governmental powers or that the effect of the government actions or measures is
truly expropriative?
15. 2 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 712, comment g (ALI 1937).
16. NAFTA, Art 1114(1), 32 ILM at 642 (cited in note 8).
17. See, for example, Pennsilvania Coal Co v Mahon, 260 US 393,415 (1922) ([V]hile property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a ralkng.. See also
Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 1015 (1992) (compensation is required when
regulation works a physical invasion of property or denies all economically beneficial or productive
use of property).
18. Restatement at § 712, comment g (cited in note 15).
19. Accordingly, the Pope & Talbot tribunal has held that "the scope of (Article 1110] dczs cover
nondiscriminatory regulation that might be said to fll within an exercise of a state's &o-called police
powers but that Article 1110 does not 'broaden [a the ordinary concept of expropriation under
international law to require compensation for measures affecting property interests without regard
to the magnitude or severity of that effect." Pope & Talhot v Canada, at para 96 (emphasis added)




Is it feasible to define a list of government activities as illustrations of legitimate
government activities not requiring compensationd
These comments demonstrate that Canada's real source of unease is not with the
substantive rule articulated in Article 1110, but with how the system itself operates.
Stated plainly, Canada is apprehensive that the arbitral tribunals constituted pursuant
to Chapter 11 may not make the right decisions.
Someone must decide, however. Granted, it is a difficult task to draw the line
between a taking and a regulation, and international law has not fully articulated all
the relevant criteria. This is equally true under domestic law (US federal and state law
not excepted) and will remain so for as long as government regulation, business
enterprise, and technological innovation entwine in ever increasing complexity.21 In
light of the aims and objectives of NAFTA Chapter 11, then, who should judge?
Although not stated in so many words, the implication of Canada's call for an
interpretive statement is for the NAFTA Parties to take the power of decision away
from the international tribunals constituted under Chapter 11, leaving it to municipal
law, it may be supposed, to provide any redress. Canada effectively has agreed with
those public interest groups that interpret investor claims under Article 1110 as a
cynical and illegitimate attempt to bypass the domestic political process and
undermine environmental and other public interest laws, regulations, and procedures.
Understandable as it may be, this concern is short-sighted and misplaced. What
the NAFTA Parties set out to accomplish-the protection and promotion of
investment through the uniform application of rules and guarantees in all three
NAFTA countries-can best be sustained through the enforcement of Chapter 11 by
independent and impartial international tribunals. Justice and fairness demand that
Canada and the United States live up to the same substantive rules and procedural
mechanisms as have been accepted by Mexico, and they need not worry about doing
so. The international adjudication of investor-State disputes has a long history and, as
the increasing caseloads of such disputes at arbitral institutions such as the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes demonstrate, has become
commonplace. The arbitrators participating in these cases are highly competent
members of academia and the international bar, with experience and expertise in the
relevant areas of law exceeding that of the vast majority of the domestic judiciary in
each of the three NAFTA countries. The quality of decisions being rendered in these
20. Sheri, Inside US Trade at 21 (cited in note 12).
21. As long ago as 1959 it was recognized that "the distinction between a State's acts of expropriation
founded on the right of 'eminent domain' and those which fall within the exercise of its police
power-a distinction which originally stems from differences in grounds and purposes and also has
a bearing on the question of compensation-is daily becoming more difficult to make, because of the
evolution which the conception of the State's social functions has undergone in both those areas."




cases is high and there is every indication that the tribunals are properly balancing the
legitimate interests of both investors and the NAFTA Parties. .
Perhaps just as important, however, is the impact that Chapter 11 cases-and
the NAFTA Parties themselves-will have on the further development of
international law. Canada may be wary of having to defend indirect expropriation
claims because of the lack of clear rules in this area of the law, but the very
indefiniteness of the law represents an opportunity. With each new case commenced,
the NAFTA countries will be arguing their interpretations of international law and
urging their views of the proper application of each provision of Chapter 11. Not only
will the NAFTA Parties gain expertise through their regular participation in such
proceedings; their persistent involvement in Chapter 11 cases cannot help but
influence and shape the direction of international investment law in ways that will best
serve their nationals' interests. Moreover, as more and more cases are decided, the
content of NAFTA's substantive rules will be expounded, the Parties' treaty
obligations clarified, and important principles of international law refined, thus
helping to sustain and develop the rule-based investment regime that the NAFTA
Parties are in the process of creating.
There is in the end, therefore, little substance to the argument that NAFTA
empowers corporate interests at the expense of legitimate regulation. Let the NAFTA
countries legislate in a truly non-discriminatory manner, let them extend the same
opportunities to alien investors as their own nationals; let them in accordance with
international law compensate for measures that substantially destroy the value of alien
investments; let them, in short, live up to their substantive obligations under NAFTA
Chapter 11, and they will be vindicated in any arbitration brought against them. Even
when arbitral decisions go against a NAFTA Party, however, participation in the
22. Indeed, of the three final awards that have been rendered in Chapter 11 ca-es thus far, two have
been rendered in the State Respondents favor. See Azinian v United Mexican States, Award (Nov 1,
1999) 39 ILM 537 (2000) (finding in Mexico's favor) also available online at
<http://wv.naftadaims.com> (visited April 3, 2001); Waste Mar.agent, Ire v, United Mexican
States, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/98/2, Award Uune 2, 2000) (finding in Mexico's favor) also
available online at <http://www.nafiadaims.com> (visited April 3, 2001); Metaldad Corp v United
Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Avard (Aug 30, 2000) (finding in favor of the
investor) also available online at <http://www.nftacaims.com> (visited April 3, 2001).
In a fourth case, as part of a bifurcation of the merits in that proceeding. the tribunal issued an
Interim Award in favor of the State Respondent on two of the four claims, including the
expropriation claim under Article 1110. See Pope & Taltot v Canada. Finally, in a Partial Award
rendered in SD Myers v Canada, the tribunal found in favor of the investor on two of four claims, but
did so by finding that the government measure in question vas discriminatory; it rjecred the
investo's expropriation claim under Article 1110. SD fye', Irc v Government of Car.ila, Partial
Award (Nov 13, 2000) available online at <http://w,^v.appletonlaw.com/caes/Meyers - Final




process will have its benefits. In either case, the rule of law will be realized, and thus
strengthened for the future.
202 'J0o. 2 WO. I
